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The Future of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet
Sung
By John C. Coffee, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
Much commentary about securities litigation shares the implicit premise
that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Reform Act)'
is, for better or worse, afait accompli--that is, legislation whose meaning is
fixed and whose impact, while still debatable, is not contingent on future
events. This Article sees it differently: the Reform Act is more like wet clay
that has been shaped into an approximation of a human form by an
apprentice craftsmen and has now been turned over to the master sculptor
for the details that will spell the difference between high art and merely
competent mediocrity. Legislation, like art, requires interpretation, and
until that interpretive process is further along, the Reform Act must be
regarded as still in its early formative period.
In short, the future of the Reform Act remains to be decided. Thus,
while others may wish to evaluate the Reform Act in normative terms as
either "good" or "bad" legislation-a necessary response to real problems
or an overreaction to imaginary ones-the more important inquiry in this
Article's estimation is to survey the discretion that federal courts possess
and the range of decisions that they shortly will be called upon to make
with regard to the Reform Act. Congress has simply left too many ambig-
uous gaps and statutory hiatuses for the Reform Act's impact to be reliably
assessed at this point.
The process of judicial interpretation by which these gaps are filled in
seems likely to be shaped by three principal considerations. First, although
Congress has spoken, it put many of its most vehement and specific state-
ments into the legislative history of the Reform Act.2 The Supreme Court
*Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. The author served as
a legal consultant and adviser to the White House's Office of General Counsel during the
consideration and passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The views
expressed herein are strictly his own.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
2. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730 [hereinafter HOuSE REPORT].
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has shown, however, that it will pay little attention to statements in leg-
islative history that are not "anchored" to some provision in the statutory
text.3 Thus, practitioners who are relying on the often emphatic statements
in the legislative history may be omitting a critical step: is there a sufficient
nexus between a statement in the legislative history and the statutory text
to make the statement enforceable?
Second, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commis-
sion) could have an even more decisive role than the courts in shaping the
Reform Act. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,4 courts must defer to the administrative
agency with regard to construction of a statute that the agency adminis-
ters.5 Unless Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue, "the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a per-
missible construction of the statute."'6 To be sure, the Reform Act does
not present the classic case for Chevron deference, because much in the
Reform Act involves the processes of litigation, an area where the SEC
has neither primary jurisdiction nor special expertise. Still, in some areas-
most notably, the Reform Act's safe harbor for forward-looking informa-
tion-the SEC could adopt definitional rules (e.g., defining what consti-
tutes a "meaningful cautionary statement"). Although the SEC has shown
little appetite for activism to date in this area (possibly out of a prudent
desire to let matters rest until congressional tempers cool), SEC rulemaking
eventually could have a decisive impact on the significance of the Reform
Act (particularly if congressional majorities change and the SEC feels less
vulnerable than it may feel today about its budget).
Third, adaptive responses by the parties to the new legislation are pre-
dictable and will seek to exploit these statutory ambiguities. A period of
intense gamesmanship and experimentation seems likely, as new litigation
strategies are attempted (with predictably mixed results). In addition, new
players, such as institutional investors willing to take on the responsibilities
of the "lead plaintiff," may or may not materialize. At best, monitoring
may improve because of institutional oversight; but, at worst, some plain-
tiffs' lawyers may simply exploit the lead plaintiff concept to impose a tax
on the other participants.
The structure of this Article follows from this tripartite division. Part I
examines those areas where courts will necessarily struggle with statements
in the Reform Act's legislative history. This process has already begun,
and the first results confirm this Article's predictions. Part II then considers
the scope of the SEC's rulemaking authority with regard to the Reform
Act, and Part III turns to the new litigation tactics with which both sides
3. See, e.g., Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (1994).
4. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
5. Id. at 844.
6. Id. at 843.
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are likely to experiment. While it is not this Article's thesis that the Reform
Act will have only marginal significance or that courts will seek to nullify
its provisions, the extent of judicial discretion that the Reform Act cur-
rently affords courts is nonetheless extraordinary. Add to this picture the
facts that the Reform Act primarily addresses litigation and that federal
courts have long been conscious of the advantages of procedural unifor-
mity, and a hypothesis suggests itself: courts are likely to resist efforts to
develop a separate procedural jurisprudence uniquely applicable to secu-
rities class actions. If so, less may change than has been predicted.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE TENSIONS IN THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Simply stated, some of the boldest, broadest statements in the Reform
Act's legislative history have only a tenuous connection to its statutory
text. Two examples stand out: the Reform Act's new pleading standards
7
and its safe harbor for forward-looking information.8 These were, of
course, two of the most controversial provisions in the Reform Act, and
the two whose unacceptability was primarily stressed by the President in
his veto message.9 In each case, some of the strongest statements in the
Reform Act's legislative history arguably lack any anchor in the Reform
Act's statutory text.
PLEADIVG STANDARDS
The pre-passage debate over the Reform Act became the most heated
when it turned to the Reform Act's pleading standards. 10 Some of the
provisions, however, affect only modest change; others have an impact
that is still largely unpredictable. New section 21D (entitled "Private Se-
curities Litigation") to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)
provides examples that fall into both categories. Specifically, new section
21D(b)(1) requires the complaint in a securities fraud case to "specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the
statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.""II In truth, the first
clause in this provision does not go much (if at all) beyond the prevailing
law in most federal circuits today, which normally requires plaintiffs to
7. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b) (West Supp. 1996).
8. Id. § 77z-2.
9. 141 CONG. REC. H15,214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
10. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4 (West Supp. 1996).
11. Id. § 78u-4(b)(1).
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plead with specificity, except "when factual information is peculiarly
within the defendant's knowledge or control.'
12
In contrast, the second clause in section 21D requiring the plaintiff to
"state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed" when
pleading on information and belief is more of a wild card. Does this pro-
vision require the plaintiff to disclose confidential sources of information
(for example, the identity of, and substance of communications from whis-
deblowers inside the corporate issuer)? Would it require that information
normally protected as attorney work product be disclosed? Some have
argued that it may. 13 Courts seem unlikely to go this far, but today, major
question marks clearly overhang any pleading made on information and
belief.
If the Reform Act's impact on the particularity of the pleadings is un-
certain, its effect on pleading scienter is clearer and more drastic. When
scienter must be alleged (as under Rule 1Ob-5), 14 new section 21D(b)(2) of
the 1934 Act requires that the complaint "state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind."' 5 Although this provision will not apply to the negligence-
based or strict liability provisions of the securities laws, 16 it will require
that actions based on Rule I Ob-5 plead facts giving rise to at least a strong
inference of recklessness on the part of each defendant. On its face, this
provision seems only to codify what the Second Circuit already required 7
(although it certainly rejected the Ninth Circuit's far more liberal pleading
standard, which basically permitted conclusory pleadings of fraud). 18
But according to the Reform Act's legislative history, this provision may
12. Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 285 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 934
(1992) (quoting In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 645 (3d Cir. 1990)). Shapiro also
required the complaint to set forth the facts on which a belief was formed when the pleading
was based on information and belief. Id. at 284-85.
13. See Letter from Dean John Sexton of New York University Law School to President
WilliamJ. Clinton (Dec. 13, 1995), in 2 SWEEPING REFORM: LITIGATING AND BESPEAKING
CAUTION UNDER THE NEW SECURITIES LAws 282-83 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Hand-
book Series No. B-924 1996) [hereinafter SWEEPING REFORM]. The author's own letters are
also reprinted in this volume, but they refrained from criticizing the Reform Act's pleading
standards and focused solely on its safe harbor provision. Id. at 285-92.
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1995).
15. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2) (West Supp. 1996).
16. For example, it will not apply to §§ 11 or 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act),
or § 16(b) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k (1994 & West Supp. 1996); id. §§ 771, 78p(b).
17. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding
particularized facts must raise "strong inference of fraud."). The Second Circuit's approach
has been more or less adopted by at least three other circuits. See Tuchman v. DSC Comm.
Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1994); Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25
(1st Cir. 1992); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
941 (1990).
18. See Decker v. GlenFed, Inc. (In re GlenFed Inc. Sec. Litig.), 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th
Cir. 1994); Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398, 1403 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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impose requirements that go well beyond those of the Second Circuit. 19
In the Second Circuit, the requirement that the plaintiff plead facts raising
a "strong inference of fraud" is tempered by a mitigating rule that rec-
ognizes that the plaintiff can satisfy this requirement by "alleg[ing] facts
showing a motive for committing fraud and a clear opportunity for doing
so. '"20 Other courts outside the Second Circuit seem also to have some-
times followed this rule.
21
To fully reflect the Second Circuit's standard, Senator Arlen Specter
added an amendment on the Senate floor to S. 240, which instructed
courts that a strong inference of fraud could be established by particular-
ized pleadings of motive, opportunity, or recklessness. 22 This provision
was, however, deleted from the final Conference Report. Alone, this de-
letion might have had relatively little significance because the statutory
language quoted above could easily have been read as simply a shorthand
instruction to apply the Second Circuit's well-known standard. At most,
different circuits might have taken slightly different approaches to when a
showing of motive and opportunity raised a strong inference of fraud.
But the deletion did not stand alone. Rather, the Statement of Man-
agers, which constitutes the legislative history to the Conference Report,
states that Congress desired a stricter rule than the Second Circuit's stan-
dard:
Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard, the Second Circuit
requirement is that the plaintiff state facts with particularity, and that
these facts, in turn, must give rise to a 'strong inference' of the de-
fendant's fraudulent intent. Because the Conference Committee in-
tends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend
to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading stan-
dard.2
3
A footnote to this paragraph then explains the deletion of the Specter
Amendment: "For this reason, the Conference Report chose not to include
19. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 31-49.
20. San Leandro Emergency Medical Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co.,
Inc., 75 F.3d 801, 813 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128.
21. In particular, the First, Fifth and Seventh Circuits appear to follow some variant of
the Second Circuit's rule. See Tuchman, 14 F.3d at 1068; Greenstone, 975 F.2d at 25; DiLeo,
901 F.2d at 629; Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Kapcor, 814 F. Supp. 720, 728 (N.D.
Ill. 1993).
22. 141 CONG. REC. S17,959-61 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Senator Specter).
The Specter Amendment provided that a "strong inference" could be raised by "alleging
facts to show the defendant had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or by alleging
facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness
by the defendant." The full text of the Specter Amendment, which was passed by the full
Senate by a vote of 57 to 42 on June 28, 1995, is set forth in 2 SWEEPING REFORM, supra
note 13, at 795-98.
23. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 41.
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in the pleading standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity,
or recklessness.
' 24
But if this provision does not codify the Second Circuit's standard, what
standard does it codify? How much stricter is it? Here, the above-quoted
language has its own ambiguity. Although it implies that the statutory
standard is to be stricter than the Second Circuit's standard, it gives no
indication of how much stricter. Even the above-quoted footnote says only
that "certain language" relating to motive and opportunity was deleted,
25
not that a showing of motive and opportunity in a given case is insufficient
to show scienter.
Indeed, the more closely that one examines the legislative history on
this point, the murkier the issue gets. On December 5, 1995, Senator
D'Amato submitted the report of the Conference Committee to the full
Senate, reviewed the proposed legislation topic by topic, and said only the
following about its new stricter pleading standards: "The legislation creates
a uniform standard for complaints that allege securities fraud. This stan-
dard is already the law in New York. It requires a plaintiff plead facts
giving rise to a strong inference of the defendant's fraudulent intent."2 6 In
short, rather than reversing or tightening the Second Circuit's standard,
the legislation was presented as essentially codifying it.
A colloquy then followed between Senators Dodd and Specter, with the
latter objecting that the Conference Report, by deleting the motive and
opportunity language in the Specter Amendment, "omits a very critical
factor in giving guidance as to how a plaintiff meets this tough standard
for pleading state of mind."'27 Although Senator Specter objected that "the
plain truth of the matter is that this is an impossible pleading standard...
you simply do not have a way that a plaintiff realistically can go into the
Federal court under the securities acts and have a fair chance to state a
case," 28 Senator Dodd responded that the language endorsed the Second
Circuit's standard, but simply permitted individual courts some discretion
on a case by case basis: "We are using the standards in the [S]econd
[C]ircuit in that regard, then letting the courts-as these matters will-
test. They can then refer to specific cases, the [S]econd [C]ircuit, other-
wise, to determine if these standards are based on facts and circumstances
in a particular case. ' 29 To be sure, Senator Dodd's reply is less than crystal
clear, but he appears to be saying that courts could find well-pleaded par-
ticularized allegations of motive and opportunity to be sufficient in some
cases, but not necessarily in all cases. At no point, either in the Senate
debates on December 5th and 6th or in the debate in both Houses follow-
24. Id. at 48 n.23.
25. Id.
26. 141 CONG. REC. S 17,934 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995).
27. Id. at S17,960.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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ing the presidential veto, did any Senator or Representative argue that the
Reform Act should be read to disable the plaintiff from pleading facts
showing motive and opportunity as a means of pleading scienter.
Whatever the Senators' intent, it is an entirely different question
whether courts will give effect to statements in legislative history that seem
to impose an additional or different requirement beyond that in the stat-
utory language. Novel as this issue may seem to the securities lawyer, it
has often been faced by the Supreme Court, which has divided over it
with some regularity. Although Justice Scalia has become well-known for
his view that legislative history is a "make-weight" and a "fairyland,"
30
the majority of the Court continues to accord legislative history consid-
erable weight in most circumstances.
31
Nonetheless, there is at least one clear limitation on the majority's will-
ingness to consider legislative history: any such statement must be "an-
chored" to the text of the statute.32 Most recently, in Shannon v. United
States,33 the Court confronted a statute whose conference report specifically
"endorsed" a procedure used in one circuit by which the jury was given
specific instructions in connection with the insanity defense. As clear and
specific as this statement was, the Court still gave no weight to this con-
gressional "endorsement" and instead adopted a very different procedure,
stating "[w]e are not aware of any case ... in which we have given au-
thoritative weight to a single passage of legislative history that is in no way
anchored in the text of the statute." 34 Quoting a D.C. Circuit decision,
the Court added that "courts have no authority to enforce [a] principl[e]
gleaned solely from legislative history that has no statutory reference
point.''35
While Shannon rejected an "endorsement" in legislative history of one
circuit's approach, the legislative history of the Reform Act's new pleading
standard arguably presents the mirror-image situation: the rejection (or
non-endorsement) in legislative history of the Second Circuit's interpre-
tation of its own pleading rule. From Shannon's perspective then, courts
should simply focus on the statutory text and ignore the surplusage in the
legislative history.
Still, however equivocal the legislative history is, it can be argued that
the President's veto message resolved any ambiguity and unmistakenly
30. Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 116 S. Ct. 637, 646 (1996)
(Scalia, J., concurring); see also Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 617
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating legislative history is "unreliable . . . as a genuine indi-
cator of congressional intent").
31. Bank One Chicago, 116 S. Ct. at 642. See, in particular, the concurring opinion ofJus-
tice Stevens. Id. at 643-45 (Stevens, J., concurring).
32. Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419 (1994).
33. Id. at 2426.
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 814
F.2d 697, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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framed the issue. The President's veto message clearly emphasized that
the President found any standard stricter than the Second Circuit's pre-
existing standard to be unacceptable.36 Accordingly, proponents of a
stricter standard might argue that in overriding the President's veto, Con-
gress was unequivocally adopting a stricter standard. The problem with
this line of argument is two-fold. First, this is simply not what Congress
said it was doing. For example, rejecting the President's criticisms of the
Reform Act's pleading standards, Senator Bradley answered the President
on the Senate floor just before the veto was overridden:
In fact, the language of the bill does codify the [S]econd [C]ircuit
standard in part-and the [S]tatement of [M]anagers says so.
But even within the [S]econd [C]ircuit, there are varying inter-
pretations of the standard. That is why the conference report delib-
erately rejects a complete codification of the [S]econd [C]ircuit and
adopts language which is substantially similar to the language in the
Senate-passed bill and its report language.
37
Senator Domenici followed Senator Bradley and made basically the same
point that the Act adopted the "Second Circuit's pleading standard.
'38
Second, the President's characterization of the Reform Act cannot de-
termine what Congress itself intended. In summary, that intent seems only
to have been to give federal courts discretion to determine how they would
apply the core provisions of the Second Circuit approach.
Operationally then, how are the new pleading standards likely to play
out? The most likely answer is about the same as they worked in the recent
past in the Second Circuit. Thus, if plaintiffs can show that senior exec-
utives sold a significant stake in their corporation while the corporation
itself withheld any reference to pending adverse developments, this nor-
mally should be sufficient to show motive and opportunity-and hence
raise a "strong inference" of scienter against the individual defendants. 39
As to the non-trading defendants, however, the action is likely to be dis-
missed. As a result, the classic "stock drop" case may survive only when
there has been suspicious trading activity by insiders (or their tippees) or
some similar form of self-dealing. Even before the Reform Act, there were
distinct signs that courts were moving in this direction and declining to
36. 141 CONG. REC. H15,214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
37. Id. at S19,149 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995).
38. Id. at S19,150.
39. See, e.g., San Leandro Emergency Medical Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris
Co., Inc., 75 F.3d 801, 814 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of the complaint against all
senior executives of Philip Morris, except an executive who had sold substantial shares). For
other cases in which suspicious trading by defendants has given rise to the requisite inference
of fraud, see Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1994); Greenstone v.
Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 26 (1 st Cir. 1992); Schneider v. Vennard (In re Apple Computer
Sec. Litig.), 886 F.2d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 943 (1990).
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allow allegations of material misrepresentations or omissions to survive a
motion to dismiss, unless plaintiffs could plead reasons why the defendants'
self-interest lead them to withhold disclosure.
40
This trend has accelerated with the first decisions under the Reform
Act. The first decision to consider the Reform Act's heightened pleading
standards, Marksman Partners, L.. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp.,4 1 adopted
the Second Circuit's "motive and opportunity" test for proof of scienter
in its entirety Responding to the defendants' claim that footnote 23 to the
Statement of Managers42 made clear that Congress had not codified the
Second Circuit's test, the court displayed exactly the polite disdain for
legislative history as a source of substantive policy that this Article has
suggested is predictable:
The footnote, embedded as it is in the legislative history and not the
body of the statute, implies that Congress chose not to codify motive
and opportunity as pleading requirements but does not indicate that
Congress chose to specifically disapprove the motive and opportunity
test. This Court has little doubt that when Congress wishes to supplant ajudi-
cially-created rule it knows how to do so explicitly, and in the body of the statute.
43
On the merits, the court found the "motive and opportunity" test to be
consistent with the Reform Act's purposes, relatively invulnerable to abuse,
and to represent a tested and proven pleading rule which courts outside
the Second Circuit should also adopt.
44
Applying the "motive and opportunity" test to the facts of the case
before it, the Chantal court faced exactly the type of seemingly meritorious
"stock drop" case that many had believed would not survive the Reform
Act's new pleading standards. Basically, the defendant corporation had
reported a very substantial rise in revenues by including in earnings sales
40. See Brogren v. Pohlad, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19927, at *9 (D. Minn. Sept. 27, 1995);
Ferber v. Travelers Corp., 802 F. Supp. 698, 713-14 (D. Conn. 1992).
41. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7179 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 1996). One other case has also
addressed the Reform Act's pleading standards and, without discussion, applied both prongs
of the Second Circuit's standard. In Zeid v. Kimberley, 1996 WL 310124, Civ. No. 96-
20136 (N.D. Cal.June 6, 1996), the court dismissed the complaint (but with leave to replead)
after finding that it failed to "include 'facts constituting circumstantial evidence of either
reckless or conscious behavior." Id. at *7 (quoting ZVI Trading Corp. Employees' Money
Purchase Pension Plan and Trust v. Ross (In re Time Warner Sec. Litig.), 9 F.3d 259, 269
(2d Cir. 1993)). The principal factual difference between Zeid and Chantal, which each in-
volved the allegedly premature recognition of income on consignment sales, was that there
was no allegation of insider stock sales prior to disclosure of the adverse developments in
Zeid.
42. See supra text accompanying note 24.
43. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7179 at *36-*37 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
44. Id. at *34-*39. The court stressed that the Senate Banking Committee Report indi-
cated that the Committee did not wish to "adopt a new and untested pleading standard that
would generate additional litigation." Id. at *39 (citing S. REP. No. 98, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694).
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that had been made on consignment to buyers who had a continuing right
to return the product. These consignment sales had accounted for fifty
percent of the firm's 1995 revenues, and ninety percent of its estimated
revenues for the final quarter of 1995.45 When Barron's revealed the highly
questionable accounting underlying recognition of the sales in earnings,
the corporation's stock price fell sixty-two percent in two days.4 6 One
month earlier, the corporation's founder and CEO had sold twenty percent
of her holdings for $6.3 million at the height of the market.47 To show
motive and opportunity, the plaintiffs raised four arguments: (i) the com-
pany's improper accounting enhanced the value of the company's stock;
(ii) similarly, it enabled the company to complete a substantial private
placement at an inflated price; (iii) it protected the executive position and
compensation of the company's founder and CEO; and (iv) it enabled the
CEO to sell a substantial portion of her own stock holdings at an inflated
price.48 Interestingly, the district court appeared to reject the first three of
these arguments, relying on Second Circuit precedents holding that " 'al-
legations of motive that are generally held by similarly positioned execu-
tives and companies ... are insufficient.' -49 But it found the fourth factor
sufficient. 50 Although Chantal does not imply that a twenty percent stock
sale will always suffice to show motive and opportunity, it does make clear
that unusual trading patterns and the receipt of substantial proceeds will
constitute a sufficient showing to defeat a motion to dismiss. 5
1
As an alternative ground for its decision, the Chantal court also adopted
the second prong of the Second Circuit's pleading rule,52 which permits
the plaintiff to raise the requisite inference of fraud by pleading facts that
show "strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or reck-
lessness."'53 Here, it found that the clear violation of a GAAP accounting
principal when coupled with other facts satisfied this standard. 54 Conceiv-
45. Chantal's projected revenues for 1995 "represented nearly an 8000% increase in
revenues from fiscal 1994." Id.
46. Id. at*10.
47. Id. at *9.
48. Id. at *40.
49. Id. at *35 (quoting Glickman v. Alexander & Alexander Services, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2325, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Grossman v. Texas Commerce Bankshares,
Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13501, at *37 (S.D.N.Y. 1995))); see also Acito v. IMCERA
Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting claim that requisite motive was shown by
insiders' desire to increase compensation).
50. Chantal, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *42.
51. Id. at *42-*44; see also Acito, 47 F.3d at *54 (2d Cir. 1995) (requiring that insider
transactions be "unusual" and out of line with prior trading pattern to satisfy required stan-
dard).
52. Id. at *45-*49.
53. Id. at *46. The court noted that the strength of the complaint's allegations would have
to be corresponding greater under this prong. Id.
54. The court made clear that an accounting violation standing along would not constitute
strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness. Id. at *47 (citing
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ably, this alternative holding could prove to have the greater significance
because it frees the plaintiff from necessarily having to demonstrate con-
duct tantamount to insider trading by a defendant. In cases where there
are not suspicious sales by insiders, it alone will be available. This alter-
native standard also answers a question that the Chantal court did not
squarely face: why should the action continue against the corporate de-
fendant because of the self-interested misconduct of an individual defen-
dant? The implicit answer may be that when the corporation's own actions
appear on their face reckless, the court need not worry about the fairness
of holding the corporation vicariously liable for the insider's misdeeds.
LEAVE TO REPLEAD
The predictable independence of federal courts has also manifested itself
in a refusal to dismiss with prejudice an action that fails to satisfy the
Reform Act's pleading standards. Section 21 D(b)(3)(A) of the Reform Act
provides that "[i]n any private action arising under this [title], the court
shall, on the motion of any defendant, dismiss the complaint if the require-
ments of" the Reform Act's pleading standards are not met.5 5 This sounds
mandatory. Still, in Zeid v. Kimberley,56 the first court to constitute this
language wrote:
[T]here is nothing in this language to indicate that district courts are
required to dismiss securities fraud claims without leave to amend.
Further, without a clear directive from Congress, this Court refuses
to read into the Reform Act any limitation on the ability of trial courts
to permit an opportunity to amend.
5 7
At work here seems to be an unsurprising distaste for special procedural
rules applicable to a limited context and inconsistent with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. But as a result, plaintiffs may get a second chance
to replead, with the result that the harshness of the Reform Act's pleading
requirements may be significantly mitigated.
DISCOVERY
Traditionally, stays of discovery have been disfavored, with the burden
being on the defendants to justify them.58 The Reform Act, however,
Dannenberg v. PaineWebber, Inc. (In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 50 F.3d 615,
627 (9th Cir. 1994)). The determinative factor for the court may have been the corporation's
own self interest in completing a substantial private placement without disclosure. For similar
findings that violations of accounting rules can raise an inference of fraud, see Malone v.
Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 478-79 (4th Cir. 1994) and In re Chambers Development
Sec. Litig., 848 F. Supp. 602, 620 (W.D. Pa. 1994).
55. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
56. 1996 WL 310124, Civ. No. 96-20136 SW (N.D. Cal.June 6, 1996).
57. Zeid, 1996 WL 310124, at *8.
58. See Blakenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975); Gray v. First
Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 40 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Employers
Ins. ofWausau, 124 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Nev. 1989).
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contains several special stay provisions in order to limit what Congress
perceived as fishing expeditions by plaintiffs. 59 A particularly important
such provision is set forth in both section 27A() of the 1933 Act and section
21E() of the 1934 Act, which each provide with regard to forward-looking
statements:
In any private action arising under this subchapter, the court shall
stay discovery (other than discovery that is specifically directed to the applicability
of the exemption provided for in this section) during the pendency of any
motion by a defendant for summary judgment that is based on the
[safe harbor contained in these sections] .60
Uniquely, this stay provision is not subject to the "undue prejudice"
exception that is tacked onto the Reform Act's other stay provisions.
On its face, this provision's intent seems clear enough: plaintiffs cannot
get general discovery, but can obtain discovery "specifically directed to the
applicability of" the safe harbor. Again, however, the Statement of Man-
agers may conflict with the statutory language by instructing courts to limit
discovery: "The first prong of the safe harbor requires courts to examine
only the cautionary statement accompanying the forward-looking state-
ment. Courts should not examine the state of mind of the person making the state-
ment." 61 Simply stated, the issue again is whether this ban on "state of
mind" discovery is sufficiently anchored to the statutory text.
From the plaintiffs' perspective, one can argue that this instruction is in
considerable tension with the statutory text, because it would effectively
preclude discovery "specifically directed to the applicability of the exemp-
tion."' 62 From the defendants' perspective, however, the legislative history
merely explains that the first prong of the safe harbor expresses an entirely
objective test, which makes inquiry into the defendants' subjective state of
mind superfluous. That is, under subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) of the safe harbor
provisions in both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, a "forward-looking
statement" cannot create private civil liability if it is "identified as a for-
ward-looking statement, and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary
statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to
differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement." 63 To the
extent that this first prong of the safe harbor looks only to the objective
meaning of the cautionary statements provided, discovery directed to the
59. Section 101 ofthe Act adds § 27(b) to the 1933 Act and § 21D(b)(3) to the 1934 Act,
which each stay discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1
(West Supp. 1996); id. § 78u-4. Both these stays are subject to an "undue prejudice" limita-
tion.
60. Id. § 77z-(l); id. § 78u-5(o (emphasis added).
61. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 44 (emphasis added). For the conflicting statutory
language, see § 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-2(c)(!)(A) (West Supp. 1996); id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A).
62. See supra text accompanying note 43.
63. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1996); id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i).
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good faith or state of mind of its draftsmen arguably would not be "spe-
cifically directed to the applicability of the exemption provided for in"
subsection (c)(1)(A)(i).
Although there is certainly a logic to this position, the ambiguous char-
acter of the word "meaningful" clouds that logic. In the context in which
it is used, the phrase, "meaningful cautionary statements," seems intended
to draw a contrast between substantive disclosure and "boilerplate," pro
forma risk disclosure, and thus it requires some individualized tailoring to
the issuer's specific circumstances. Alone, this could justify limited discov-
ery: was the forward-looking statement tailored to the company's individ-
ual circumstances as management appreciated those circumstances? Some
may also believe that the term "meaningful" incorporates an element of
good faith, and hence a statement written in bad faith becomes "non-
meaningful." Indeed, cases applying the "bespeaks caution" doctrine (the
intellectual parent of the Reform Act's safe harbor) have recognized that
the doctrine does not "offer protection against a certain kind of statement:
one that is misleading because it either fails to state a material fact or states
a material fact falsely"
64
Consistent with this interpretation, the Statement of Managers recog-
nized that, to satisfy this first prong, "[t]he cautionary statements must
convey substantive information about factors that realistically could cause
results to differ materially from those projected" 65 and that the cited "im-
portant factors" must be "relevant to the projection." 66 Arguably, this focus
on "realism" and "relevance" could justify some discovery of the forward-
looking statement's draftsmen, who were presumably required to make
such judgments. In short, even if the first prong sets forth an objective
standard, it does not necessarily follow that this forecloses all discovery,
and some inquiry into the "meaningfulness" of the risk disclosures still
seems authorized. If so, the text and the legislative history are again in
conflict, because what the text gives, the legislative history attempts to take
away
To be sure, courts can easily sidestep this conflict when it is clear on the
face of the cautionary statement that detailed disclosures, tailored to the
facts of the issuer's individual circumstances, were provided. But in the
grayer cases that will eventually emerge, courts could find that the term
"meaningful" connotes a sense of sincerity and good faith or at least an
individualized focus on the company's special position in the industry,
which in either case may make some discovery of the draftsmen's state of
mind justifiable.
The foregoing analysis may overrate the importance of the stay provi-
64. Isquith v. Middle S. Util., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 203 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926
(1988); see Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 489 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 613 (1994).
65. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 43 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 43-44 (emphasis added).
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sion in sections 27A and 21E, because this stay applies only to motions
for summary judgment that are based on the Reform Act's safe harbor
for forward-looking information. In contrast, when a motion to dismiss is
made, other provisions in the Reform Act govern and provide that dis-
covery is to be stayed during the pendency of the motion, subject to a
special and limited exception for "undue prejudice. ' 67 Defendants may
therefore prefer to move to dismiss and avoid arguments about whether
requested discovery is "specifically directed to the applicability" of the safe
harbor. Obviously, this discrepancy raises a question as to when a motion
to dismiss (in contrast to a motion for summary judgment) can be suc-
cessfully used based on the Reform Act's safe harbor provisions.
Under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, motions to dismiss increasingly
have been successful.68 Under the Reform Act's expanded safe harbor, the
availability of a motion to dismiss may initially depend upon which of the
safe harbor's two prongs the defendant is seeking to utilize. Under the first
prong, which purports to codify the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, the de-
fendant seemingly need show only that "meaningful cautionary state-
ments" were provided that satisfied the statutory standard. 69 On its face,
this seems an objective standard that might be determined off the face of
the pleadings (or certainly defendants will so claim). The second prong
instead focuses on whether "the plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-
looking statement.., was made with actual knowledge.., that the state-
ment was false or misleading."' 70 This seems to be a subjective standard,
which almost certainly contemplates that the plaintiff should receive a
chance to prove scienter and hence to obtain discovery Hence, only a
motion for summary judgment at the completion of discovery should log-
ically be able to raise this second prong's defense. As a practical matter,
this means that defendants will rely much more on the first (or "bespeaks
caution") prong of the safe harbor than its second prong. Motions to dis-
miss based on the former predictably will be filed even before the defen-
dant files its answer.
Still, it does not follow that a motion to dismiss always can be used to
assert the first prong of the safe harbor. The legislative history to the safe
harbor makes clear that the safe harbor does not apply to false statements
of "historical fact" included within a forward-looking statement.71 Hence,
67. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-1(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1996). Unlike the heightened
pleading requirements of the Reform Act, these stay provisions apply to the 1933 Act as well
as the 1934 Act.
68. See Kaufman v. Trump's Castle Funding (In re DonaldJ. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.),
7 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1219 (1994); Ferber v. Travelers Corp.,
802 F. Supp. 698 (D. Conn. 1992).
69. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77-2(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1996).
70. Id. § 77-2(c)(1)(B).
71. See HousiE REPORT, supra note 2, at 44 ("A cautionary statement that misstates his-
torical facts is not covered by the safe harbor.").
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to the extent that misstatements (and possibly omissions) of material facts
are alleged, plaintiffs may be able to avoid a motion to dismiss. Of course,
this will not always be possible, but this tactic may in turn induce corporate
counsel to avoid or minimize statements of "historical fact" in their "mean-
ingful cautionary statements." Unfortunately, the net result implies infor-
mation loss for investors.
KNFOWLVG LIES AND THE SAFE HARBOR
Probably the most striking feature of the Reform Act's safe harbor is
the immunity it seems to give to a bald, knowing lie that is surrounded by
"meaningful cautionary statements." As the safe harbor is drafted, a per-
son making a forward-looking statement need satisfy only one of the safe
harbor's two alternative tests. The first of these tests covers forward-look-
ing statements "accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements iden-
tifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially
from those in the forward-looking statement," 72 while the second test pro-
tects the statement if "the plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-looking
statement.., was made with actual knowledge... that the statement was
false or misleading." 73 Arguably, the second prong would add nothing and
thus would be superfluous if the first prong did not protect a false statement
that was accompanied by "meaningful cautionary statements."
As a matter of statutory interpretation, any reading of these two prongs
that renders the second prong superfluous must be avoided. Still, to read
the first (or bespeaks caution) prong as immunizing a deliberately false
projection simply because some "important factors" that could prevent
the projection from being fulfilled were also disclosed requires one to be-
lieve Congress saw some policy reason to protect knowing falsehoods. Not
only does this interpretation sound unseemly, but there is also a semantic
problem: can a cautionary statement truly be "meaningful" if it qualifies
a lie? Put differently, one could easily read "meaningful" to require that
the cautionary statements provide corrective disclosures that offset or at
least significantly dilute the false statement. That is, statements that did
not correct or minimize the lie are arguably not "meaningful." On this
theory, if the cautionary language did not provide substantive risk disclo-
sure that rendered the false statement either immaterial or made reliance
upon it unreasonable, then arguably the cautionary statements would fail
to satisfy the "meaningfulness" criterion.
Ultimately, to construe the "bespeaks caution" prong not to protect
knowingly false forward-looking statements that are accompanied by cau-
tionary statements, it is necessary to suggest an interpretation that assigns
a non-redundant role to the second prong. Only then do the two prongs
72. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1996).
73. Id. § 77z-2(c)(1)(B); id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B).
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have a plausible relationship. One possible such interpretation is the fol-
lowing, which focuses on the level of scienter that the plaintiff must show:
(i) The "bespeaks caution" prong provides protection when the cau-
tionary statement renders the false statement (whether made
knowingly or recklessly) either objectively immaterial or incapable
of being reasonably relied upon, but not otherwise; and
(ii) The second prong immunizes recklessly made false statements
that fail the first prong because their cautionary statements did
not satisfy the above "meaningfulness" criterion.
Under this construction, a knowingly false forward-looking statement
would only be protected when it had been rendered immaterial or inca-
pable of reasonable reliance, but a recklessly false forward-looking state-
ment would always be protected by the second prong (even when not
properly qualified by meaningful cautionary statements).
This proposed interpretation that a "meaningful cautionary statement"
is one that sufficiently corrects or mitigates the false statement so as to
render it either immaterial or "non-reliable" is consistent with the "be-
speaks caution" doctrine, which the safe harbor was originally intended
to codify.74 "Bespeaks caution" decisions have differed in terms of whether
they have found a properly qualified forward-looking statement to be im-
material or incapable of reasonable reliance, but they have agreed that
the doctrine did not protect false statements. 75 Although it is likely that
the Reform Act's safe harbor was intended to go well beyond the "bespeaks
caution" case law and relax the "specific tailoring" requirement imposed
by the majority of the "bespeaks caution" cases, 76 this does not imply that
a knowingly false statement unaccompanied by a special qualification must
escape liability.
Two serious problems must, however, be faced by this proposed inter-
pretation that meaningful cautionary statements must render the know-
ingly false statement immaterial or incapable of reasonable reliance. First,
there is a problem in the interrelationship between clauses (i) and (ii) of
subsection (c)(1)(A) of the safe harbor.7 7 Subsection (c)(1)(A)(ii) provides that
a forward-looking statement cannot result in private liability if it is "im-
74. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 43, notes that"[t]he Conference Committee safe
harbor like the Senate safe harbor, is based on aspects of SEC Rule 175 and the judicial
[sic] created 'bespeaks caution' doctrine."
75. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
76. For cases requiring that warnings be "tailored to the specific future projections, esti-
mates, or opinions," see Kaufman v. Trump's Castle Funding (In re DonaldJ. Trump Casino
Sec. Litig.), 7 F.3d 357, 371-72 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1219 (1994).
77. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (West Supp. 1996). Clause (i) provides that a for-
ward-looking statement cannot result in private liability if it is "identified as a forward-looking
statement, and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important
factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward looking
statement." Id.
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material." Thus, if subclause (i) of subsection (c)(1)(A) is read to require
that the "meaningful cautionary statements" render the false statement
immaterial, arguably subclause (ii) sounds superfluous. A closer look at the
drafting history, however, explains this puzzle. The October 26, 1995 draft
conference report shows that subsection (c)(1)(A)(ii) originally said "oth-
erwise immaterial,"178 implying in effect that a properly qualified forward-
looking statement was also immaterial as a matter of law. In the November
9, 1995 draft and in the final conference report, the word "otherwise" was
dropped, probably as a simplifying language change. Given this evolution
of the language, subclause (i) appears to be saying that a forward-looking
statement that is properly qualified by "meaningful cautionary statements"
becomes immaterial, but, even if not so qualified, it can be immaterial for
other and independent reasons under subclause (ii). Indeed, the Statement
of Managers virtually spells this out.
79
How much qualification is necessary to render a false statement im-
material? On this question, the legislative history sheds only oblique light.
On the one hand, the Statement of Managers warns that "boilerplate
warnings will not suffice as meaningful cautionary statements," 80 but, on
the other hand, it opines that "not all factors" that could cause actual
results to deviate from predicted results need be disclosed. 8' Both assertions
deal only with the extreme ends of the continuum and nothing in the
legislative history purports to define "meaningful."
The second and subtler problem for courts comes from another brief
sentence in the Statement of Managers, which acknowledges that "[a]
cautionary statement that misstates historical facts is not covered by the
safe harbor."82 Appropriate as this distinction is between "historical" and
"forward-looking" information, it might also be read as a negative preg-
nant, which implies that false forward-looking statements are protected by
the safe harbor (while backward-looking "historical" statements are not).
The best answer to this interpretation is to concede that false forward-
looking statements are indeed sometimes protected, but only when the cau-
tionary disclosure is "meaningful." Of course, this takes us back full circle
to our initial question of what "meaningful" means.
78. See 2 SWEEPING REFORM, supra note 13, at 127.
79. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 44. Referring to subsection (c)(1)(A)(ii), the Statement
of Managers states: "Courts may continue to find a forward-looking statement immaterial
... on other grounds." Id. (emphasis added). To clarify this point, the Conference Committee
included language in the safe harbor provision that no liability attaches to forward-looking
statements that are "immaterial." Id. This explanation that a forward-looking statement
could be "immaterial ... on other grounds" implies that it is also immaterial under clause
(i) when properly qualified by meaningful cautionary statements. Id.
80. Id. at 43.
81. Id. at 44.
82. Id.
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OTHER SOURCES OF LIABILITY FOR FORWARD-LOOKING
STATEMENTS
Assume for the sake of argument that courts do decide that the "be-
speaks caution" prong of the safe harbor is satisfied so long as some "im-
portant factors" are disclosed and no material misstatement of "historical"
fact is made. Unquestionably, this is a possible interpretation. If so, is there
any remaining source of liability for a knowingly false projection?
Two possibilities need to be considered: (i) the duty, if any, to update
prior disclosures, and (ii) the mandatory obligation to disclose certain for-
ward-looking information in the Management's Discussion and Analysis
of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A), which Reg-
ulation S-K requires the issuer to include in its periodic reports filed under
the 1934 Act.
83
The long-uncertain status of the duty to update is no less obscure under
the Reform Act. Although the Reform Act is quick to announce that
nothing in its safe harbors "shall impose upon any person a duty to update
a forward-looking statement,"8 4 this statement borders on the tautological.
Safe harbors do not by definition impose duties or create liabilities; rather,
they are exceptions from rules that do. Had Congress wished to eliminate
liability for the failure to update, it simply could have provided that there
shall be no liability for a forward-looking statement that was accurate when
made because circumstances changed after the date on which it was made.
But Congress did not say this and seems to have been content to leave
existing law intact. Those decisions that have suggested that there is a duty
to update have basically limited this duty to forward-looking statements
that were likely to continue to be relied upon by investors. 85 As a result,
many statements covered by the safe harbors could fall within this zone.
As a practical matter, the potential for liability may be greatest when oral
forward-looking statements incorporate by reference previously filed cau-
tionary statements that have not been updated.
A more speculative basis for liability is that the failure to disclose certain
types of forward-looking information may constitute a material omission
83. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1995). The modern framework for MD&A disclosures was
first outlined in a 1987 Concept Release. Concept Release on Management's Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, 52 Fed.
Reg. 13,715 (Apr. 17, 1987) (interpreting the MD&A disclosure obligation). It was then
extended in a 1989 Interpretative Release. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Finan-
cial Condition and Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Secu-
rities Act Release No. 6835, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427 (May 18, 1989) [hereinafter Interpretative
Release].
84. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-2(d) (West Supp. 1996); id. § 78u-5(d).
85. Compare ZVI Trading Corp. Employees' Money Purchase Pension Plan (In re Time
Warner Inc. Sec. Litig.), 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994)
with Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 16-18 (1st Cir. 1990) (en bane); see also Dennis
J. Block et al., A Post-Polaroid Snapshot of the Duty to Correct Disclosure, 1991 COLurM. Bus. L.
RIv. 139 (1991).
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under the mandatory provisions of the MD&A. Indeed, to the extent that
the MD&A does require specific forward-looking disclosures, these disclo-
sures could also be found to be materially misleading if they were accom-
panied only by a listing of a few "important factors." Specifically, Item
303 of Regulation S-K requires a reporting company to include in its
MD&A a description of "any known trends or uncertainties that have had
or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or
unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing
operations."'86 In substance, this would seem to amount to a mandatory
obligation (at least when the trend or event is "known"), and, as the SEC's
recent decision in In re Bank of Boston Corp.87 illustrates, an unjustified failure
to make such a forecast can result in at least administrative liability.
88
Reviewing the SEC's administrative decisions on the MD&A, one com-
mentator has recently generalized that
[t]he common theme from these cases is that a projection, trend or
prospective event must be discussed if either the issuer's management
felt the matter important enough to tell a third party, whether the
board of directors, prospective buyers or public investors, or third
parties felt it important enough to tell or alert the issuer's manage-
ment. 89
Alone, this gloss on the MD&A could require updating (at least as of the
time of Form 1O-Q or 10-K filings) of a previously made forward-looking
statement.
What complicates the MD&A disclosure obligation, however, is a special
definition of materiality that the SEC applies only in this context. Essen-
tially, if management is unable to determine that a known trend, demand,
commitment, event or uncertainty "is not reasonably liely to occur," then
it must objectively evaluate the consequences of that trend, demand, com-
mitment, event or uncertainty, on the assumption that it will come to
fruition. 90 In short, disclosure of a known trend, uncertainty or event is
86. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1995).
87. 60 S.E.C. 2695 (Dec. 22, 1995).
88. Id. Bank of Boston failed to disclose "material facts and known trends and uncertain-
ties [in its Form 10-Q] concerning the deterioration of its loan portfolio which [it] reasonably
could expect would have a material unfavorable impact on its financial condition and results
from operation." Id.
Although the Bank of Boston decision is the only litigated decision, the SEC has also entered
into a series of recent settlements involving MD&A disclosure. See In re Gibson Greetings,
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 36357, 60 S.E.C. 1154 (Oct. 11, 1995); In re Shared Medical
Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 33632, 56 S.E.C. 199 (Feb. 17, 1994); In re Presidential
Life Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 31934, 53 S.E.C. 1563 (Mar. 1, 1993); In re Caterpillar
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30532, 51 S.E.C. 147 (Mar. 31, 1992).
89. Morris Simkin, SECDisclosure Requirements: MD&A: When to Include Forward-Looking State-
ments, N.Y. LJ., May 16, 1996, at 5.
90. Interpretative Release, supra note 66.
994 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 51, August 1996
required unless management can determine that a material effect on the
registrant's financial condition or results of operations is not reasonably
likely to occur.
At first glance, this theory may seem to cast a substantial cloud over the
Act's safe harbor. Yet, because the MD&As standard of materiality is dif-
ferent from the probability/magnitude tradeoff that the Supreme Court
endorsed in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,9 1 several courts have found that a violation
of Item 303's requirements "does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that
such disclosure would be required under Rule 1Ob-5. Such a duty to dis-
close must be separately shown."' 92 Indeed, one recent review of the cases
finds no instance in which private liability has been imposed for a failure
to make a disclosure mandated by Item 303.
93
Still, even if the theory is undeveloped, recent SEC administrative de-
cisions may spur its growth, and there seems no inherent policy reason
why a failure to disclose information mandated by Item 303 should not
be actionable in a private action (assuming that the plaintiff proves ma-
teriality under Basic's normal standard). The greater practical difficulty will
probably be proving scienter, which cannot be assumed simply because
material omissions were made. 94 Still, other facts (such as recent stock sales)
may sometimes show the requisite motive and opportunity sufficient to
satisfy at least the Second Circuit's test.
95
Corporate counsel may, of course, seek to treat the MD&A as falling
within the Reform Act's safe harbor by expressly identifying the MD&A
as forward-looking statements and attaching "meaningful cautionary state-
ments." But Item 303 has its own mandatory requirements, which are not
superseded by the Reform Act. For example, in one well-known enforce-
ment action, the issuer failed to acknowledge in its MD&A that an austerity
program initiated by the Brazilian government would result in a material
decline in its revenues from a major subsidiary.96 Today, it is arguable that
under the Reform Act's safe harbor this same issuer might well escape
private liability if it had forecast flat earnings (and thus no decline), at least
provided that it had listed some "important factors" in its "meaningful
91. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
92. Alfus v. Pyramid Technology Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 608 (N.D. Cal. 1991); see
Morris v. Newman (In re Convergent Technologies Sec. Litig.), 948 F.2d 507, 516 (9th Cir.
1991); Halkin v. VeriFone Inc. (In re VeriFone Sec. Litig.), 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1483 (N.D.
Cal. 1992), affd, 11 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1993).
93. SuzanneJ. Romajas, The Duty to Disclose Forward-Looking Information: A Look at the Future
of MD&A, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S245, S261 n.120 (1993). But see Shaw v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996) (reversing in part dismissal by district court of antifraud
action with regard to forward-looking statements).
94. See Ferber v. Travelers Corp., 802 F. Supp. 698, 713-14 (D. Conn. 1992); Brogren v.
Pohlad, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19927, at *9 (D. Minn. Sept. 27, 1995).
95. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
96. See In re Caterpillar Co., Exchange Act Release No. 30532, 51 S.E.C. 147 (Mar. 31,
1992).
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cautionary statements." What it cannot do, however, is ignore the known
event (i.e., the austerity program) and make no disclosure about its known
likely impact on its future revenues. Thus, even if its projection of flat
earnings is permissible, its failure to disclose a known material trend or
event that undercuts that projection is not.
As a result, a day-versus-night distinction arises between "known events
or uncertainties," whose impact may well have to be disclosed in all ma-
terial detail, and optional forward-looking statements, which need only be
surrounded by "meaningful cautionary statements." Known trends or
events may also be deemed to involve "historical facts," which the State-
ment of Managers recognizes cannot be misstated.
97
AN ASSESSMENT
Although the Reform Act seeks to tilt the balance in securities litigation
in favor of the defendant at virtually every juncture, one juncture that
experienced litigators recognize as critical received relatively little atten-
tion: the permissible scope of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 98 The utility of such a motion to
defendants in securities litigation has expanded in recent years, and it is
now clear that the court can look beyond the face of the complaint. 99
Thus, if a plaintiff chooses to focus on one snippet of a prospectus or press
release and ignore surrounding statements, courts can and do look at the
entire disclosure when defendants seek to supplement the record for pur-
poses of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion.100 Nonetheless, all well-pleaded facts
alleged by the plaintiff must be taken as true for purposes of a motion to
dismiss, and few courts will delve into fact-intensive allegations at the mo-
tion to dismiss stage.1
0 l
Ultimately, the protective capacity of the safe harbor may hinge signif-
icantly on whether a motion to dismiss can effectively assert it. If courts
resist the use of motions to dismiss and defendants must rely onl motions
for summary judgment, discovery will be possible and costly, and plaintiffs
will thereby gain leverage in settlement negotiations. The draftsmen of the
Reform Act probably understood this and therefore provided that the safe
harbor could be raised by either a motion to dismiss or motion for sum-
mary judgment. 1 02 In addition, leaving nothing to chance, they authorized
97. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 44.
98. FED R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
99. See San Leandro Emergency Medical Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co.,
Inc., 75 F.3d 801, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1996); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10461, *76-*78 (lst Cir. May 7, 1996).
100. See San Lendro Emergency Medical Group, 75 F.3d at 808-09.
101. See Schaffer v. Timberland Co., 1996 WL 238706, *21 (D. N.H. Mar. 18, 1996).
102. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-2 (West Supp. 1996); id. § 78u-5 (referring to a motion to dismiss);
see also id. § 77z-2(); id. § 78u-5(o) (authorizing a special stay "during the pendency of any
motion by a defendant for summary judgment" based on the safe harbor).
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the court in connection with a motion to dismiss to consider any "cau-
tionary statement accompanying the forward-looking statement" (even if
not cited in the plaintiffs' complaint).
103
The problem that the Reform Act does not address, however, arises
when the plaintiff pleads with particularity that the forward-looking state-
ment was not accompanied by "meaningful cautionary statements" and
that the "important factors" it cites failed to provide adequate substantive
information sufficient to satisfy the Reform Act's standards. Although this
tactic will not work as a conclusory pleading, cautious courts, attuned to
the usual distinctions between a motion to dismiss and a motion for sum-
maryjudgment, may well feel compelled to side with the plaintiff and deny
a motion to dismiss when the adequacy of the cautionary statements have
been "meaningfully" attacked. Although the defendant may still eventually
triumph at the summary judgment stage, its victory will be costly (and
sometimes pyrrhic).
This leads to a final, more generalized observation: it is difficult to graft
special procedural rules for securities litigation onto the ancient stem of
federal civil procedure. Some grafts simply may not take, and resistance,
conscious or unconscious, from courts is to be expected.
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION: TO WHAT
EXTENT CAN THE SEC MODIFY THE REFORM ACT?
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 104 is the seminal
decision of modern administrative law and is generally read to require
judicial deference to the administrative agency's construction of the critical
terms in its statute. 105 Under Chevron, when a court faces an interpretation
of a statute by an agency responsible for administering that statute, it must
first determine if Congress has spoken directly to the issue. If it has not,
then the court must defer to any "reasonable" agency interpretation of
the statute. 
1 06
Let us assume then that at some point in the future the SEC were to
adopt rules purporting to interpret important terms in the Reform Act.
Faced with such a legal challenge to such a rule raised by some litigant, a
court would need to conduct a two-part inquiry: (i) had Congress spoken
directly to the statutory question; and (ii) if not, was the SEC's interpre-
tation "reasonable"? Clearly, such an analysis can yield different answers
103. Id. § 77z-2(e); id. § 78u-5(e).
104. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
105. As with all important decisions, there are variant interpretations of its holding and
methodology. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE LJ. 511, 512-513 (1989). From time to time, there have been hints of a modest retreat
by the Court from the high water mark of judicial deference in Chevron. See INS v. Cardoza
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987).
106. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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to different specific questions, but a few obvious questions are discussed
below.
THE SAFE HARBOR: WHAT SCOPE FOR SEC RULEMAKIVG?
Assume that a registrant disclosed three out of five "important factors"
on which it knew that its projection of future earnings depended, but it
deliberately withheld disclosure of the two most important factors, because
its disclosure of these factors would tend to stigmatize and discredit senior
management officials of the firm. Today, such incomplete disclosure may
suffice to meet the Reform Act's standards, because the minimal disclosure
provided did identify "important factors that could cause actual results to
differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement." At least if
some substantive significant information is conveyed (i.e., more than boil-
erplate), the Reform Act's modest standards may be satisfied.
But SEC rulemaking might change this picture. For example, consider
the result on the same facts if the SEC were to adopt a rule defining
"meaningful cautionary statements" to require the disclosure of the "most
important factors then believed by management to be likely to cause actual
results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement."
Such a rule is not unlike language that the SEC informally suggested prior
to the Reform Act's adoption (but which the Conference Committee de-
clined to adopt).10 7 Although this language was not accepted, no negative
inference is generally drawn from congressional inaction.
The initial issue for a reviewing court in a case challenging such a rule
would be whether the Reform Act directly spoke to this issue. Clearly, the
Reform Act's legislative history says that not all "important factors" need
be disclosed. But, permitting the company to withhold some "important
factors" is not inconsistent with defining "meaningful" to require disclo-
sure of the "most important factors believed by management to be likely
to cause actual results" to deviate from forecasted results. Seemingly, this
is an example of the kind of tightening of the safe harbor that SEC rule-
making could affect without transgressing the outer constraints imposed
by the statute or evident in its legislative history.
To be sure, even this example is not free from doubt. The Statement
of Managers does seek to preclude inquiry into the "state of mind" of any
person, 10 8 and this could be read as a direct congressional statement ad-
dressing and precluding any SEC effort to identify the most important
factors.
Still, if this hurdle can be passed, the next question is easier. Such an
SEC rule seems reasonable in relation to the Reform Act's overall structure
107. These suggestions were informally made, either as a form of technical assistance that
the SEC normally provides to the Congress or through suggestions made by individual
Commissioners. They are not, for the most part, reflected in the House or Senate hearings.
108. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 44.
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and purpose. Here, the overall purpose of the 1934 Act remains the dis-
closure of material information to investors, and a requirement that an
issuer not withhold the most important factors actually known to it seems
fully consistent with (and reasonable in light of) those purposes.
THE NEW SEC EXEMPTIVE AUTHORITY
One of the most important unresolved question under the Reform Act
involves the scope of the Commission's exemptive authority under the
Reform Act. Subsection (g) to both sections 2 7A and 21 E grants the Com-
mission the following seemingly unlimited authority:
Exemption Authority-In addition to the exemptions provided for in this
section, the Commission may, by rule or regulation, provide exemp-
tions from or under any provision of this title, including with respect
to liability that is based on a statement or that is based on projections
or other forward-looking information, if and to the extent that any
such exemption is consistent with the public interest and the protec-
tion of investors, as determined by the Commission.109
Read literally, this authority transcends the narrow topic of forward-look-
ing statements, or even that of litigation reform generally, and could en-
compass far-ranging exemptions (e.g., exemptions from section 5 of the
1933 Act or new safe harbors under sections 11 and 12(2) thereof)."10
Adding to this impression of a broad scope is the subsection of the Reform
Act that follows-subsection (h) (entitled Effect on Other Authority of
Commission) to both sections 27A and 21E-which states that the Com-
mission may "adopt similar rules and regulations with respect to forward-
looking statements under any other statute under which the Commission
exercises rulemaking authority."1 11 Because subsection (h) is expressly lim-
ited to forward-looking statements, while subsection (g) is not (and indeed
subsection (g) lists rules with respect to liability for forward-looking state-
ments as an illustrative example), the statutory structure of sections 27A
and 21 E suggest that a much broader grant of authority was intended
under (g) than under (h) (otherwise subsections (g) and (h) would largely
be duplicative).
The counterargument to this claim begins with the fact that subsection
(a) of the same two statutory provisions suggests a narrower scope to the
entire section, one limited to the context of forward-looking statements:
"(a) Applicability-This section shall apply only to a forward looking state-
ment made by ... 1112 Proponents of this narrower view read this language
to mean that both sections 27A and 21E concern only the topic of forward-
109. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77uz-2(g), 78u-5(g) (West Supp. 1996).
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77k, 771(1994 & West Supp. 1996).
111. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-2(h), 78u-5(h) (West Supp. 1996).
112. Id. §§ 77z-2(a), 78u-5(a).
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looking statements. Although this narrower interpretation is currently the
"politically correct" one within the staff of the Commission, it faces an
obvious problem. The minimum intent of subsections (g) and (h) seems to
be to authorize safe harbors beyond the scope of subsection (a) (such as,
for example, forward-looking statements made by a nonreporting com-
pany). If then (g) and (h) must go beyond the scope of subsection (a) to
have any real meaning, it seems contradictory to read them as constrained
by (a).
Whatever the SEC decides on this issue, it seems likely that courts will
defer to the SEC's decision, both under the Chevron line of cases and be-
cause the Statement of Managers is relatively silent on this point.
1 3 Im-
portant as this issue is, it may be mooted by the impending passage of the
Fields Bill, which contains an even broader and clearer grant of exemptive
authority for the SEC. 
114
ADAPTIVE RESPONSES: HOW WILL THE TACTICS
CHANGE?
The Reform Act is likely to affect significantly the litigation tactics of
both sides. In particular, plaintiffs' lawyers will need to consider a variety
of options that they have previously resisted, including the following:
A MIGRATION TO STATE COURTS?
In some jurisdictions, there are strong incentives for plaintiffs to sue in
state court, either under state law theories or based upon the 1933 Act."
15
For example, the Arizona securities fraud statute is clearly modelled after
Rule 1Ob-5,11 6 but even an innocent misrepresentation can violate it, be-
cause there it does not require the plaintiff to prove scienter. 17 Moreover,
Arizona (as with several other states) makes securities fraud a predicate
113. The Statement of Managers does direct the SEC to consider additional safe harbors
for non-qualifying issuers. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 31-49. This direction is hardly
exhaustive of subsection (g)'s scope, but it can be cited as showing that the draftsmen were
primarily focused on forward-looking statements.
114. Both the House and Senate have passed legislation that contains a broad grant of
exemptive authority for the SEC. In the Senate, S. 18 15 ("Securities Investment Promotion
Act of 1996") was passed by unanimous consent on June 27, and in the House, H.R. 3005
("Securities Amendments of 1996") passed by a vote of 407-8 on June 19, 1996. See BNA
PENSIONS & BENEFITS DAILY, July 9, 1996 (available on LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File).
115. Unlike the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Securities Act of 1933 does not
provide that federal courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction, and thus claims arising
under the 1933 Act can be asserted in state court.
116. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1991 (1989).
117. See Rosier v. First Fin. Corp., 889 P.2d 11, 15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). But see Rosenthal
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 908 P.2d 1095, 1102 (Colo. 1995) (en bane) (requiring proof
of scienter).
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offense for its state "little RICO" statute, which provides for treble dam-
ages. 118 Plaintiffs may be even more attracted to state courts by their desire
to obtain punitive damages, which can be sought at the state level, but are
unavailable as a measure of damages under the federal securities laws.'119
Still, the tradeoff for plaintiffs between state and federal court is com-
plicated, and some important factors still tip in the direction of federal
court. In state court, at least in any common law action for fraud, deceit,
or negligent misrepresentation, the primary problem for plaintiffs will be
their likely inability to utilize the "fraud on the market" doctrine that
typically governs in federal securities fraud cases; 120 instead, plaintiffs may
be required to prove actual reliance on the alleged misrepresentations or
omissions. 12 1 Indeed, in 1993 in Mirkin v. Wasserman,122 the California Su-
preme Court observed that up to that point (with the exception of one
unpublished opinion) no state court had applied the fraud on the market
doctrine to common law fraud claims. 12 3 Since then, the situation has
become cloudier. Although no state has upheld the "fraud on the market"
doctrine,124 several have found that plaintiffs need not plead direct reliance
in actions based on the state's Blue Sky statute. 125 Although it is difficult
118. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(D)(4)(r) (1989 & West Supp. 1995); id. § 13-
2314(A); see also DeJonghe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 830 P.2d 862, 867 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991) (affirming civil RICO recovery based on securities fraud and for negligent supervision).
119. Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has long been read to preclude
awards of punitive damages. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1994). See Richard D. Gamblin & Paul H.
Stephenson III, Punitive Damages and the Federal Securities Act: Recovery Via Pendent Jurisdiction, 47
Miss. LJ. 743, 749 (1976).
120. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988). Circuits disagree about the
scope of this doctrine, with some applying it only to efficient markets.
121. See Mirken v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568, 570 (Cal. 1993).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 571-72 n.3 (citing Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 611 A.2d 467, 474-75 (Del. 1992));
Kahler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 558 So.2d 144, 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Peil v. Speiser,
806 F.2d 1154, 1163 n.17 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[N]o state courts have adopted the [fraud-on-
the-market] theory, and thus direct reliance remains a requirement of a common law secu-
rities fraud claim.").
124. One intermediate appellate court did adopt the "fraud on the market" doctrine. See
Rosenthal v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 883 P.2d 522, 526 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). The
Colorado Supreme Court reversed, however, deciding that the question had been "unnec-
essarily addressed." Rosenthal v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 908 P.2d 1095, 1106 (Colo. 1996).
See infra note 125. Other recent decisions have assumed that the doctrine does not apply
outside the context of the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Antonson v. Robertson, 141 F.R.D.
501, 508 (D. Kansas 1991); Bunch v. KMART Corp. 898 P.2d 170, 172 (Okla. Ct. App.
1995).
125. See Rosenthal, 908 P.2d at 1100-04 (Colo. 1996); Weatherly v. Deloitte & Touche,
905 S.W. 2d 642, 648-49 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) ("Texas Securities Act does not require the
buyer to prove reliance on the seller's misrepresentations or omissions"). In Rosenthal, al-
though the Colorado Supreme Court refused to adopt or reject the "fraud on the market"
doctrine, it actually reinstated the class action, reversing the lower court and finding that it
was sufficient for the plaintiffs to plead that the defendants' misstatements or omissions had
caused them harm. Rosenthal, 908 P.2d at 1103-04.
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to predict the future behavior of other state courts, many seem likely by
one means or another to spare plaintiffs from the traditional common law
pleading requirements for fraud.
Of course, state statutory law may change, and a major effort to create
a "friendly" state forum that could serve as an attractive substitute to
federal court is currently being promoted by plaintiffs' lawyers in a state-
wide referendum in California. 126 But this effort confronts a variety of
problems. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts'27 raises a particularly high obstacle
to class certification of a multi-state class action by holding that the U.S.
Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause would preclude the application
of California law to the non-resident class members holding claims under
the laws of their respective jurisdictions. 128 Further, the attempt to impose
punitive damages based on out-of-state conduct by the defendant has been
found to violate the Due Process Clause.129 More generally, the Court
may be in the process of placing limits on the capacity of one state to
regulate in a manner that effectively sets national policy or constrains the
choices of other states.'
30
Regardless of the fate of the "fraud on the market" doctrine in state
courts, plaintiffs may still have reason to migrate to state court. Although
it is often assumed that the "fraud on the market" doctrine is critical to
the availability of a class action, this may overstate the case. One possible
alternative might be to plead a limited class action in which the "common
questions of law and fact" are defined so as to exclude the "individual"
issue of reliance. 131 As a result, if liability were found on the class-certified
126. See Neil Lewis, California Measure Could Trump U.S. Law on Securities Suits, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 1996, at A13. (describing ballot initiative that would authorize a class action under
a provision paralleling Rule 1Ob-5 against both primary violators and those aiding or "as-
sisting" the fraud). The California initiative would also allow plaintiffs' lawyers to solicit
clients and would deny the state authority to limit punitive damages. Id.
127. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
128. Id. at 814-23. Federal courts have found that in a class action covering residents of
multiple states, variations in state law are likely to "swamp any common issues and defeat
[the] predominance" requirement of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); Georgine v. Amchem Prod.,
83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).
129. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1597-98 (1996).
130. The BMWdecision may breathe new life into the Supreme Court's decision in Healy
v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1989), which held that the Commerce Clause con-
strained a state from imposing its own policy choices on, or restricting the "autonomy" of
neighboring states. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1597 ("We think it follows from these principles
of state sovereignity and comity that a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators
of its laws with the intent of changing tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States"). This
language, however, occasioned sharp dissent.
131. Most securities class actions are certified under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). To certify
such a class action, the federal court must find that there are both common issues of law or
fact, which the class members share, and that these issues "predominate" over individual
issues. State class action rules typically parallel Rule 23 and thus require a similar finding of
"predominance." A court, however, may certify a class action with respect to particular
issues only. Id.
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issues (chiefly, materiality and scienter), plaintiffs would still be required
to prove causation in an individual proceeding. As a practical matter, this
would be costly for all sides (including the judicial system), but it is far
from clear that the defendant could comfortably rely on this defense. Set-
tlement (possibly at a reduced level) still seems likely.'
3 2
The more problematic issue for plaintiffs seeking to utilize a state class
action is whether the state court can certify a nationwide class action
composed primarily of out-of-state residents. That is, while the state court
class action will work relatively efficiently for an action primarily involving
state residents, much more difficult problems arise when a nationwide class
action is pleaded. Typically, the state's Blue Sky statute will not apply to
out-of-state transactions, unless there exists a strong "transactional nexus"
between the out-of-state purchaser and the forum jurisdiction.13 3 Hence,
difficult conflict-of-law questions arise as to governing law and as to
whether a class can be certified whose members will be asserting the laws
of multiple jurisdictions. 1
34
As a result, securities fraud class actions in state court seem feasible
today mainly in those cases where the offering was conducted from or
within a single jurisdiction and the law of a single jurisdiction applies to
the claims of the class members. But these cases are far from rare, and
some of them shift to state court.
SUE WHERE THE REFORM ACT LEAST APPLIES
The Reform Act is selective. Its special pleading rules with regard to
scienter apply only to the 1934 Act and not to causes of action under the
1933 Act (which do not require proof of scienter).135 Similarly, the Reform
Act's safe harbor does not apply to nonreporting companies and to a
132. Such a proceeding seems feasible only in "large claimant" class actions in which the
individual damages are substantial (as, for example, they are in some limited partnership
cases that are today tried in state courts). In a "small claimant" class action where the
individual damages are modest but the class is large, it is unlikely that the individual claimants
will seek to prove either reliance or their individual damages.
133. See Rosenthal v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 908 P.2d 1095, 1105 (Colo. 1996)
(applying Colorado Blue Sky statute to offer and sale in Pennsylvania where defendants issued
Offering Statement in Colorado).
134. Such classes have been certified in the mass tort context, but typically these classes
have been "settlement classes," which are certified "for settlement purposes" only. The
Supreme Court has, of course, permitted a nationwide class to be certified in state court,
provided that actual notice and a right to opt out is given to all class members. See Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). Some recent decisions, however, have tight-
ened the standards for certification and rejected the proposed class when the action would
represent a nationwide class and involve the substantive laws of most states. See In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995); Castano
v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
135. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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variety of specific transactions;' 36 nor does it apply to statements made in
the issuer's financial statements. 137 Finally, under the new "bad boy" pro-
visions of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the safe harbor does not apply to
companies that during the preceding three years have either been (i) con-
victed of certain criminal offenses under the 1934 Act, or (ii)
made the subject of ajudicial or administrative decree or order arising
out of a governmental action that (I) prohibits future violations of the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws; (I) requires that the issuer
cease and desist from violating the antifraud provisions of the secu-
rities laws; or (III) determines that the issuer violated the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws.138
Because any enforcement action (other than the very few that are re-
solved by a defendant's verdict) will result in one of these outcomes, this
provision vastly increases the significance of SEC administrative actions.
As a practical matter, these provisions define the most likely targets of
future private class actions. Leading this field of eligible targets in the future
is the initial public offering (IPO), to which the Reform Act expressly
denies its safe harbor.139 Predictably, plaintiffs' lawyers will prefer to focus
on these targets, relying in particular on sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933
Act, rather than attack the more formidable defenses afforded to "report-
ing" issuers who qualify for the Reform Act's safe harbor. In short, al-
though the Reform Act protects many companies, it may well increase the
litigation exposure of others.
Of course, these issuers can still seek to rely on the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine, which has no statutory limits. As a result, courts will continue to
decide cases involving "forward-looking" information, interpreting both
the Reform Act and the traditional "bespeaks caution" doctrine. Possibly,
this will cause the two bodies of case law to converge.
Politically, the greater exposure of IPO and nonreporting companies
(and the other classes of registrants denied the safe harbor) will exert a
continuing pressure on the SEC to grant additional exemptions pursuant
to its earlier discussed exemptive authority.
140
FOCUSLNG ON CORE DEFENDANTS
For several reasons, the Reform Act significantly weakens the incentive
to sue a peripheral defendant. First, it may be very difficult to satisfy the
pleading rules under the 1934 Act in order to show scienter on the part
of such a defendant. Second, the "proportionate liability" provisions of
136. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-2(a)(1), 77u-5(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
137. Id. §§ 77z-2(b)(2)(A), 77u-5(b)(2)(A).
138. Id. §§ 77z-2(b)(1)(A), 77u-5(b)(1)(A).
139. Id. §§ 77z-2(b)(2)(D), 78u-5(b)(2)(D).
140. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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the Reform Act also undercut the incentive to sue such a defendant.
14 1
The Reform Act's proportionate liability scheme supersedes the federal
securities laws prior system of "joint and several" liability with a new
system under which persons against whom final judgments are entered
are generally liable only for the portion of the judgment that corresponds
to the percentage of liability that the fact-finder specifically assigns to them.
Previously, an obvious incentive existed to sue outside directors under
section 11 of the 1933 Act, 142 because such directors were typically well
insured and there was little question that the insurer would honor its policy
(whereas the insurance carrier might well resist payment on claims made
by inside officers on the grounds that its policy expressly excluded liability
for knowing fraud). Thus, by naming the directors, the plaintiffs' lawyer
brought additional resources into the settlement negotiations. Now, this
has changed, because the fact-finder will likely assign a low percentage
(say ten to fifteen percent) to the outside directors with the result that the
costs of litigating against them (plus the inevitable delay) may not justify
the incremental recovery.
There are, of course, exceptions to this generalization. For example, if
the company and its insiders are insolvent (or their insurance carrier is
claiming that its policy does not cover their conduct), the outside directors
may be the only "deep pocket" that can justify the litigation. But in this
case, the real question becomes whether the plaintiff can show that these
defendants "knowingly" committed the violations complained of(in which
case the defendant becomes jointly and severally liable). 143 Even then,
however, there is still a further "Catch 22"-the more the plaintiffs estab-
lish that the violation is a knowing one (rather than simply "reckless"), the
greater the likelihood that the insurance carrier will be able to resist cov-
erage based on its exclusion for knowing fraud.
LOOK FOR "COOKED BOOKS," NOT "VAPORWARE"
Fraud involving financial statements receives far less protection under
the Reform Act than fraud involving product announcements or similar
projections. This is both because the financial statements are specifically
excluded from the coverage of the safe harbor, 144 and because most data
about past financial performance would not in any event qualify as a
forward-looking statement.
141. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77k(f), 78u-4(g) (West Supp. 1996).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994 & West Supp. 1996).
143. Section 21D(g) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(g) (West Supp. 1996), states
that joint and several liability shall be imposed "only if the trier of fact specifically determines
that such covered person knowingly committed a violation of the securities laws."
144. See id. §§ 77z-2(b)(2)(A), 78u-5(b)(2)(A) (excluding forward-looking statements "in-
cluded in a financial statement prepared in accordance with generally accounting accepted
principles.").
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False statements about product availability or capability (so-called "va-
porware") 145 are protected and insulated with great care by the Reform
Act. This probably testifies more to the political strength of the Silicon
Valley constituencies that lobbied for the safe harbor's adoption than to
the frequency of such suits.
How significant will this new relative immunity for high-technology
companies be for the future of securities class actions? One pending study
seems to suggest that such cases represent only a small fraction of securities
class actions-but also constitute the cases in which the median recoveries
are the highest. In their study of 348 settled securities class actions, Pro-
fessors Carleton, Weisbach and Weiss find that only six percent of the
settlements were attributable to cases in which the plaintiff's allegation was
that the defendant disseminated misleading information about products
under development, but these cases also had the largest median damages
and the shortest class periods. 146 In short, the data shows that these cases
were few, but also hints that they were legally meritorious. But even if
legally meritorious, there is reason to doubt the social value of such liti-
gation. Uniquely, "vaporware" is more a tactic for marketing products to
consumers than securities to investors. Although doubtful ethically, it is
well understood by consumers and almost universally employed within the
computer industry.
CONCLUSION
The recurrent message of this Article has been twofold. First, assess-
ments of the Reform Act are premature until events play out further and
courts exercise some of the discretion they have been given. Second, the
Reform Act does not represent in any sense a radical discontinuity with
prior practice, but rather accelerates trends that were preexisting.
Indeed, efforts to measure the impact of the Reform Act are apt to be
confounded by extrinsic developments that may loom as large as the Re-
form Act itself, in terms of their overall effect on securities litigation. For
example, the Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
v. Epstein 47 could do as much as anything in the Reform Act to undercut
the incentive to bring and maintain a meritorious suit, because it invites
defendants to encourage multiple plaintiffs to sue them in different forums
so defendants can settle with the lowest bidder among them. Over time,
such a structure chills the rational plaintiffs' lawyer's incentive to invest
significant time or money in the prosecution of meritorious actions.
The continuity between trends and developments preceding the Reform
145. See Robert A. Prentice &John H. Langmore, Beware of Vaporware: Product Hype and the
Securities Fraud Liabilioy of High-Tech Companies, 8 HARV.J. L. & TECH. 1 (1994).
146. Willard Carleton et al., Securities Class Action Lawsuits: A Descriptive Study, ARIZ. L. RiEv.
(forthcoming 1996).
147. 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996).
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Act and the Reform Act itself is perhaps the most significant phenomenon,
one that prevents reliance on a simple political "story" that sees the Re-
form Act as simply the consequence of an aberrational Congress or a
temporary shift to the right by a disenchanted public. In truth, both public
and judicial attitudes toward large scale class litigation have shifted-from
the visionary idealism of the 1960s to the harsher cynicism of the 1990s.
Well before the Reform Act's passage, federal courts had begun to tighten
pleading requirements, to grant motions to dismiss in securities cases,'
48
and to articulate the "bespeaks caution" doctrine to protect the disclosure
of forward-looking information. 149 The Reform Act may well have carried
these trends too far, but it did not initiate any of them.
Why did this happen? A partial answer may begin with the fact that
the Reform Act is highly selective. It probably will have only a marginal
effect on the classic "cooked books" case involving long-term financial
fraud or overstatement of earnings and/or assets, but it could immunize
"vaporware" and other forms of non-financial projections to the point
that such cases simply disappear.
From a public policy perspective, this likely impact raises an important
but difficult tradeoff. On the one hand, the prospect looms that high-tech
companies will face a "market for lemons"' 5 0-that is, an environment in
which few companies can signal that their future product announcements
are credible and most, as a result, face a general market skepticism about
such information. This danger is real, but hardly certain. After all, "va-
porware" was primarily directed at the consumer market, not the securities
market, and loss of consumer trust has not been reported as a major
obstacle in this market.' 5 ' In any event, issuers may develop market mech-
anisms by which to assure analysts and the market that their product
announcement statements are credible. Still, because high-tech industries
are almost by definition composed of young, start-up companies that face
virtually binary "boom or bust" prospects, this will not be easy, because
the incentive to dissemble is real and obvious.
On the other hand, "vaporware" may have been too endemic a practice
to expect antifraud rules to reverse ingrained industry practices. Also, the
costs of deterrence were uniquely visited on a volatile and self-conscious
148. SeeJoel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest's "Disimp~ying
Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority," 108 HARV.
L. REV. 438, 446 (1994) (noting the trend toward dismissal of securities cases on motion
before trial).
149. This doctrine also has a long history. See Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Be-
speak Caution," 49 Bus. LAw. 481 (1994).
150. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mech-
anism, 84 Qj. ECON. 488, 499-500 (1970) (employing the used car market to illustrate how
institutions can develop to counteract the effects of quality uncertainty).
15 1. This may reflect the fact, however, that commercial consumers have contractual
remedies that investors lack and can simply rescind their commitments to purchase if delivery
is delayed.
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industry that had unusually high political clout. All this, of course, could
have been said about prior aggressive SEC initiatives against insider trad-
ing or questionable overseas payments in the 1970s, where practices were
also long ingrained. What is new and different that has produced this
stronger counterreaction?
One hypothesis is that the United States will tolerate more aggressive
enforcement of the law from public servants, motivated by idealism, than
from "private attorneys general," motivated by profit. The bar, as a whole,
has an image today of the securities plaintiffs' lawyer as both overzealous
and self-regarding. This image may be unfair, wrong, oversimple-or all
of the foregoing. 152 But it suggests that the range of social misbehavior
that the "private attorney general" can effectively monitor may be limited.
To the extent that there is a perception that the "private attorney general"
is reaping windfalls in areas where the social harm is unclear, the legiti-
macy of private enforcement is undercut. Ironically, the Reform Act may
help restore the private plaintiffs' lawyer's tarnished credibility, because it
strongly encourages the private enforcer to bring suit only in cases where
the private enforcer can raise a strong inference of fraud. It thus invites
the private enforcer to reclaim the moral high ground.
This will be possible, of course, only if courts temper the Reform Act
and disdain the more extreme statements in its legislative history. The
early signs are that courts are doing just that. 153 Whether the dominant
force is the quirky independence of federal courts or their predictable
resistance to attempts to Balkanize the landscape of private civil litigation
by recognizing different procedural rules for different causes of action, the
overall pattern is one of continuity, not radical change. What courts were
doing before the Reform Act, they are now doing after it-only more so.
152. Many would dispute such a characterization of the plaintiffs bar. See, e.g., Seligman,
supra note 147. Nor is it this author's own assessment. My own view is that it is a hopeless
task to ask what percentage of securities class actions are "frivolous," because at the time of
their filing few class actions are either frivolous or meritorious in the eyes of the plaintiffs'
lawyers. Only once the plaintiffhas obtained some opportunity for discovery can the plaintiff
form an accurate assessment of the action's likely merit. Thus, the optimal reform would
probably combine a high pleading standard at a delayed point with a brief opportunity for
discovery. In this light, one attraction of the Second Circuit's "motive and opportunity"
standard, which as a practical matter focuses on insider sales, is that this factor can be
identified at low cost to the plaintiffs lawyer because such sales do usually come to light as
a result of § 16(b) of the 1934 Act.
153. The leading such indicator is Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical
Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7179 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 1996), which fully adopted the
Second Circuit's "motive and opportunity" and "strong circumstantial evidence" pleading
standards. Another respect in which courts have tempered the Act's pleading standards is by
granting leave to replead. See Zeid v. Kimberley, 1996 WL 310124, Civ. No. 96-20136 (N.D.
Cal. June 6, 1996); see also supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
